



## Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to the United Nations Office and  
other International Organizations in Geneva

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Statement

by

*Mr. Mohammad Hossein SAYYADNEJAD*

Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

before

The Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament

*Under Agenda Item 4 (Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon  
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)*

Geneva, 2 June 2026

*In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful*

Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this thematic session under agenda item 4 of the Conference. We also appreciate our distinguished Egyptian colleague who served as the coordinator of the subsidiary Body 4 in 2025 for his useful and informative presentation.

Let us use this opportunity and put it on the record that convening a specific meeting on nuclear weapons-free zones, in particular in the Middle East region, which is envisaged in the mandate of the Conference in paragraph 63(d) of SSOD-I, would be welcomed by us and many other delegations.

My delegation aligns itself with the joint statement of the Group 21 delivered earlier, and would like to make some remarks as follows:

**Mr. President,**

The only viable guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of such weapons. In this regard, the absolute and ultimate objective of the Conference on Disarmament remains the achievement of total, irreversible, and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Pending the full realization of a world free of nuclear weapons, no alternative can substitute for this vital objective. This goal must be pursued with

the utmost urgency in order to safeguard international peace and security and to ensure a world free from the increasing dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

It is the legitimate right of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons under the Grand Bargain underpinning the Treaty, to receive from the Nuclear-Weapon States effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Such assurances would strengthen the security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the NPT and thereby contribute to the advancement of the objectives of both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

While an international legal obligation for nuclear disarmament exists under the NPT, the outcome documents of its Review Conferences, and customary international law, the Nuclear-Weapon States have not only failed to fulfill this commitment but have instead continued to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. At the same time, they persist in refraining from providing Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This continued failure undermines confidence in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and runs counter to the objectives and spirit of the NPT.

Under the nuclear doctrines, strategies, and policies of certain Nuclear-Weapon States, as well as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear alliance, the use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is envisaged and, under certain circumstances, explicitly or implicitly justified. For example, the 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review broadens the range of circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be employed and does not exclude their use against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Furthermore, the development and deployment of new low-yield nuclear warheads by the United States have lowered the threshold for the potential use of nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the risk that such weapons could be employed against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. These policies and practices undermine international efforts aimed at reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and heighten concerns regarding strategic stability and international peace and security.

Unfortunately, despite repeated calls by the NPT Review Conferences agreements, numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, and

here in the Conference on Disarmament, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. Nuclear-Weapon States continue to refrain from providing Non-Nuclear-Weapon States security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This persistent lack of progress remains a matter of serious concern and continues to undermine confidence in the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Certain Nuclear-Weapon States have sought to argue that Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) should be provided only within the framework of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and have attempted to make such assurances contingent upon the establishment of those zones. This argument lacks legal and political credibility and appears intended to circumvent their international obligations and commitments. Moreover, none of the existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones has received universal, unconditional, irrevocable, and legally binding security assurances from all Nuclear-Weapon States.

The provision of Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are two distinct and independent issues. While both contribute to strengthening international peace and security and advancing the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, they should neither be conflated nor treated as mutually conditional. The implementation of one must not be made contingent upon the realization of the other.

Unilateral or multilateral statements by Nuclear-Weapon States on security assurances remain limited, ambiguous, and conditional. These statements justify the use of nuclear weapons through vague concepts such as the protection of vital interests. Furthermore, many Non-Nuclear-Weapon States are not covered by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, and the establishment of such zones in certain regions remains uncertain.

**Mr. President,**

Until the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones can also reduce the risk for the use of nuclear weapons and advance the collective efforts for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Upon the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East in 1995 as a package, non-nuclear weapon states approved the unlimited extension of the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, conditional upon the realization of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, which remains valid until its full implementation.

Regrettably, despite the 1995 Resolution, the 2010 Action Plan, and several General Assembly resolutions, due to the possession of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East by one party, the creation of a zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in the region, initially proposed by Iran in 1974, has remained elusive.

The Regime of Israel is the only obstacle to the realization of such a zone in the Middle East since it's the single party in the region possessing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Israel's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party, elimination of all its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and placing its nuclear activities and facilities under the IAEA's safeguards must be the first step to realizing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

**In conclusion, Mr. President,**

The continuation of the current state of affairs, characterized by the lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations, the failure to provide legally binding security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and the continued inability to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, does not serve the interests of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Equally harmful are the selective and discriminatory approaches that continue to undermine the credibility, integrity, and universality of the regime.

In this context, while the United States and certain European States continue to turn a blind eye to Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and its persistent refusal to accede to the NPT, they have sought to portray Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, conducted under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as a source of concern and have used it as a pretext for political pressure and, ultimately, military attacks against Iran. Such double standards erode confidence in the fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime and further diminish the prospects for achieving its fundamental objectives of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and international security.

The Conference on Disarmament should commence the negotiations of a legally binding instrument on providing assurances to non-nuclear weapon states,

and Nuclear weapon states should, without any further delay, grant non-nuclear weapon states unconditional, irrevocable, and universal assurances against the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament should also address, with the utmost urgency, avenues to overcome the obstacles to the realization of a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

In response to the remarks of the representative of the Poland, it is necessary to recall that, according to the rules of procedure, only States have the right to membership or observer status in the Conference. The European Union is neither a member of the Conference nor an observer. Moreover, several of the States on whose behalf the European Union speaks are not, in fact, members of the Conference. This action by the European Union is comparable to a situation in which, for example, an Arab country of the Conference would grant its floor to the State of Palestine to speak. Therefore, from our perspective, Poland's act of providing its floor to the European Union constitutes an abuse of its membership in the Conference on Disarmament and is contrary to the rules of procedure.

Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature, and Iran has repeatedly engaged in dialogue and negotiations to demonstrate this. But what was the outcome? The withdrawal of the United States from the agreement reached in 2015, and two acts of military aggression during the course of negotiations on this matter.

The European Union has repeatedly lost its political, legal, and moral credibility—first at the time of the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA and the desperate activation of the so-called “snapback,” thereby in effect encouraging the United States to violate its commitments; and again by aligning itself with the United States and Israel's acts of aggression against Iran and by refraining from condemning these aggressions.

While the European Union has ostensibly expressed support for the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in practice, it has provided unwavering financial, political, and military support to the only possessor of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, namely the Israeli regime. If the European Union is sincere in its claims, it should put an end to all its support for the Israeli regime and impose sanctions on it for the grave crimes it is committing.

**Thank you, Mr. President.**